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The 2005 Federal Election in Germany 2005 – an Analysis 
Sketching an Integrative Model to Explain Voting Behaviour.
Mario Paul
Abstract: Despite the existence of various signiﬁcant theories, ﬁnding one reliable
way of analysing election remains difﬁcult. The short-term impacts of election have
gained more importance for voting behaviour, while socio-structural classes have 
become differentiated even further and party identiﬁcation has become weaker. In
contrast, the accuracy of statistical data from election polls and their coverage in 
the media suggested a high quality of prognosis. The federal election in Germany 
2005 were a showcase for that. According to the author, psephology lacks a systematic 
combination of possible motives for voting behaviour. This hampers the interpretation 
of statistical data, because there is no comprehensive frame which restrains an over- 
or under-emphasis of single factors. In his article he outlines a research perspective 
that can contribute to ease this lack of systematic in psephology. His aim is to present 
a theoretical frame that brings together proﬁtable results of psephology and provides
new impulses for developing theories of voting behaviour. Only a combination of 
single approaches and thus the resulting formulation of an integrative theory – the 
main thesis of his article – is able to comprehend voting behaviour in its entirety and 
to accomplish a systematic weighting of single inﬂuence factors. A ﬁrst test for this
thesis and the outlined integrative model is the analysis of the German federal election 
of 2005.
Keywords: voting behaviour, theory, German federal election 2005, agenda-
-setting, micro-sociological theory, cleavage theory, Ann Arbor Model, social-
-psychological approach, political communication, framing process, hermeneutic, 
rational-choice approach 
Introduction
The German federal election in 2005 produced a surprising result. Contrary to all 
polls, the Union parties got only 35.2 per cent of all votes cast. The CDU) and CSU 
vote combined was around six per cent less than the polling ﬁrms had anticipated.
The disappointment of Union supporters with this poor performance was as great as 
the pollsters’ perplexity about their inaccurate forecasts. However, they pointed out 
in the run-up to the election that a signiﬁcant part of the electorate still had not made 
a decision. Do German pollsters have to feel like ‘losers’ (Ko 2005: 3) or should they 
resign as the former deputy chief editor of the Stern news magazine demanded (Priess 
2005: 14). No doubt all polls published before the election were beyond the accepted 
margin of error. Nevertheless the main business of the pollsters is the issue of election 
interpretation, not prognosis. But their evidence (the published polls measure morale 
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not votes, and have to be understood as snapshots), had been ignored on the hustling 
by politicians and the media and therefore misinterpreted. So Gerhard Schröder’s 
mantra-like statement that he wants to win election not polls, achieved an unexpected 
validation.
Table 1: ofﬁcial ﬁnal result and last published polls (survey period or day  
of publishing) for the German federal election 2005 (all data in percent)
CDU/CSU SPD FDP Linke  PDS
Bündnis 90/
Die Grünen
Ofﬁcial ﬁnal result (7 Oct.) 35,2 34,2 9,8 8,7 8,1
Infratest dimap (6/7 Sep.) 41 34 6,5 8,5 7
Forsa (5-9 Sep.) 42 35 6 7 7
TNS Emnid (10-12 Sep.) 42 33,5 6,5 8 7
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 
(6-8 Sep.) 41 34 7 8 7
Allensbach (10-15 Sep.) 41,5 32,5 8 8,5 7
Source: own composition according to the summary on „Spiegel-Online” 
[http://www.spiegel.de/ﬂash/0,5532,11717,00.html (17 February 2005)] and the ofﬁcial statistics.
Table 1 clariﬁes the differences between the last published polls before the election
and the ofﬁcial ﬁnal result of the election to the Bundestag. While the data for the
SPD, and largely for the Linke PDS, corresponds well with the vote of the electorate, 
the large difference between survey data and the actual election result for the Union 
parties is striking. In the weeks after the election psephologists and commentators 
were anxious to ﬁnd reasons to explain this bad election result for the Union parties.
The following causes were primarily stated as possible factors: Firstly, the interviewed 
persons concealed their true voting intentions or they hoped to affect the behaviour 
of the parties by giving false information (Ko 2005: 3).35 Secondly, Angela Merkel 
could not convince voters that she could be chancellor. Fifty-three per cent of voters 
wished that Schröder could continue as chancellor and only 39 per cent wanted to 
have Merkel as the new head of government (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2005b).36 
Furthermore, Merkel acted clumsily in her public appearances, less convincingly than 
Schröder and appeared almost to antagonize to a media democracy (is this a technical 
term?) (Priess 2005: 10; Drieschner 2005: 7). Thirdly, the Union parties focused their 
election campaign too much on the topics of the economy, labour market and taxes. By 
doing so they largely ignored issues like social welfare and ecology. But it is exactly 
35 Manfred Güllner of the polling company Forsa makes a similar argument: several supporters of the 
Union parties would have had an antipathy towards Angela Merkel. Therefore, they would not have 
voted for her although they had evinced that wrongly (Drieschner 2005: 6).
36 According to polls from the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 45 per cent favour the incumbent and 
just 32 per cent the challenger (Noelle 2005: 12).
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those issues that introduce the human element to politics and are important matters 
in an election campaign – especially for a Christian people’s party. In addition, the 
recruitment of Paul Kirchhof to Merkel’s shadow cabinet was, for many citizens, beco-
ming more and more like an ominous sign. He scared off large numbers of employees 
with his extensive proposal for tax reforms. He was under attack form the SPD, who 
stigmatized him as a radical reformer who was cold and aloof and campaigned against 
him, deﬁning him as a symbol of injustice (Feldenkirchen – Theile 2005: 62, 64; Dec-
kers 2005: 7; Drieschner 2005: 7; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2005b). Fourthly, many 
middle-class voters gave their second vote to the FDP. Either in the hope of enforcing 
the reform lobby in a coalition of Union parties and the FDP or to refuse an SPD/Uni-
on coalition (Feldenkrichen – Theile 2005: 64; Deckers 2005: 7; Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen 2005b).
Not all reasons are convincing; others raise further questions. Tactical voting beha-
viour and deception can be based on a multiplicity of different motives. Such a signi-
ﬁcant deviation between the expressed voting intentions and the actual votes pointing 
in one direction is therefore quite unlikely. In particular, it has to be explained why, 
unlike other federal or regional election, especially this election, the voters wanted to 
conceal their true intentions. Such a bias is largely balanced by the recall-question.37 
Also, the overemphasis of the voter’s candidate preference must be a surprise. German 
psephologists largely agree that voting behaviour in Germany is only to a small extent 
inﬂuenced by candidate alignment (Gehring – Winkler 1997: 488). More than three
quarters of the voters conﬁrmed this in a survey (Infratest dimap 2005b). Certainly, 
Schröder was favoured as chancellor in comparison to Merkel by most parts of the 
population. But comparison with the incumbent is a burden that every candidate has 
to bear. Three years ago Edmund Stoiber was compared even more unfavourably to 
Schröder. Moreover, Merkel was ranked better in important traits and skills – such as 
credibility, the potential to provide jobs or solve future problems – as the incumbent. 
Even her clumsy behaviour was – according to election observers – looked on with 
fondness by the voters (Feldenkirchen – Theile 2005: 60). Further on, why was the 
unemotional election campaign of the Union parties and the “cardinal error Kirchhof” 
(Richard Hilmer cited according to: Feldenkirchen – Theile 2005: 62) only noticeable 
on the night of the election and not already at the last pre-election polls? In the last tele-
vision debate of the leading candidates on 4 September the name “Kirchhof” had been 
connected with a socially divisive tax concept which would burden many employees 
(Feldenkrichen – Theile 2005: 62). And an advocate of social welfare and environmen-
tal issues such as Horst Seehofer was missing from Merkel’s shadow cabinet from the 
very beginning. Should not these unfavourable inﬂuencing factors have been already
37 The result of the “Sonntagsfrage” (“If next Sunday were parliamentary election which party would you 
vote for?”) is statistically weighted by the recall-question (“Would you tell me which party you voted 
for on the last election?”) and the ofﬁcial result of the last election. Voters from a party who are under-
represented by the recall-question in comparison to the actual result of the last election, are considered 
more strongly. In the reverse case it is vice versa. (Noelle-Neumann – Petersen 2005: 293-295).
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noticeable in the opinion polls, at least in the poll published on 16 September 2005 by 
the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach? Why did the voters give the CDU and CSU 
a feeling that they were in a safe position for a long time? Also, tactical voters do not 
decide spontaneously in the polling booth.
Despite some plausible reasons for the surprising election result, the remarkably lar-
ge deviations from the pre-election polls are interpreted only unsatisfactorily. Too many 
possible factors have to be taken into account, and each of them is open to interpretation: 
At what time, in which direction and with what kind of effect the factors have an impact 
on voting behaviour? The analysis is difﬁcult because there is no way of weighting the
different inﬂuences on the voting behaviour. Party identiﬁcation, performance of gover-
nment and opposition, allocation of competence to parties and candidates, tactical voting 
behaviour or media coverage, the single possible impacts stand often incoherently side 
by side. This hampers the interpretation of statistical data, because there is no compre-
hensive frame which curbs an over- or under-emphasis of single factors. This statement 
refers directly to the theoretical basis of psephology. In fact there are several signiﬁcant
theories of voting behaviour. However, a systematisation of the base motives is missing. 
Thus psephology is still facing the charge that it approaches its object of investigation 
less systematically and does not possess an ex ante deﬁned and accepted theoretical
model of explanation.38 By integrating the established models of the psephology, this 
article wants to contribute to ease the lack of systematic systematisation in psephology. 
My aim is to sketch a theoretical framework which brings together proﬁtable results
of psephology and provides new impulses for a further development of theories of the 
voting behaviour. Only the combination of the single models and hence the resulting 
formulation of an integrative theory – i.e. the main thesis – is able to explain the voting 
behaviour in its entirety and to accomplish a systematic weighting of the single inﬂuen-
cing factors. The ﬁrst practical test for this thesis and the developing integrative model
is the satisfactory answer of the aforementioned questions.
First, I present step-by-step micro- and macro-sociological motives, socio-psy-
chology factors which have an inﬂuence, rational considerations and inﬂuences of
political communication for the voting behaviour. In certain places I have modiﬁed the
established theories. I have done this on the on one hand to describe them in a better way 
and on the other hand to save the signiﬁcance of the theories, because there are social
developments that challenge their suppositions. At the same time I gradually sketch 
the integrative explanation model and clarify it by schematic illustrations. Afterwards 
I will go back into detail into the still unanswered questions of the introduction. No 
new theory of voting behaviour is developed; rather I outline an integrative explanation 
model on the basis of the well-known approaches and their scientiﬁc reception. Due
to it’s scientiﬁcally founded components it can serve as a basis for a uniform theory-
-building for psephology.
38 This critic refers to analyses of the effects of election campaigns for the voting behaviour (Bretthauer 
– Horst 2001: 407).
The 2005 Federal Election in Germany 2005 – an Analysis 
Sketching an Integrative Model to Explain Voting Behaviour
 
Mario Paul
67
Politics in Central Europe 2 (June 2006) 1
Sketch of an integrative model of voting behaviour
Micro- and macro-sociological motives
In the study The People’s Choice, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues showed that 
the social environment of the citizens shapes their voting behaviour. Family, friends, 
church, municipality, living and working conditions shape the political climate of the 
personal environment. During their political socialization citizens require a party iden-
tiﬁcation connected with their social surroundings. Social control and peer pressure
strengthen and continually modify them. According to the micro-sociological explana-
tion model, the probability of making voting according the direction given by the group 
is more likely the more the different social circles surrounding the voter correspondent 
in a political sense. Vice versa: The larger the “Cross Pressure”– the inﬂuence of po-
litically opposite social groups on the individual – the more frequent political change, 
lower political interest and lower voter participation can be observed. Lazarsfeld and his 
colleagues developed an index of political predisposition. The combination of the three 
variables socio-economic status, religious afﬁliation and place of residence proofed 
a high prognostic ability. That is why the authors made the much quoted statement: 
“[A] person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine po-
litical preference” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 27). But that does not mean they are repre-
sentative of social determinism. They also take political communication into account. 
The voters obtain information from the mass media in a two-way communication 
ﬂow: directly and through discussions with opinion leaders. These well-informed and
much highly individuals take part in political discussions more frequently. In this way 
they contribute to the embedding of the information in the social surroundings and 
to increase its meaning for potential voters. (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 84 et seq., 191 et 
seq., 199)
The micro-sociological approach still offers a good prognostic ability. However, 
it lacks explanatory power. The approach is not able to explain why socio-structural 
standards lead to a vote for one or another party. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan (1967) resolved this problem in their macro-sociological explanation mo-
del. According to this theory, profound historical conﬂicts such as nation building,
reformation or industrial revolution cause cleavages within a society. Élites and social 
groups with different interests have emerged along those different, long persisting coa-
litions and due to them, parties with a ﬁrmly aligned constituency were established that
represent the corresponding group interests in the political area. According to Lipset 
and Rokkan there are a few basic antagonisms in West European societies: Owner 
versus Worker, Centre versus Periphery, State versus Church and Land versus Industry 
are the most important. They determine, based on key cleavages, the basic pattern 
of voting behaviour and the structure of the party system. (Lipset – Rokkan 1967: 
9-26, 47) The “Cleavage Theory” creates opportunities to establish new parties only 
in revolutionary situations. Only in such politically stormy times it would be possible 
to overcome the thresholds of the political system for a successful formation of a new 
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party (Lipset – Rokkan 1967: 26-33). This thesis has no longer compatible with the 
political reality of Western European countries since the late 1980s. The resurgence 
of populist and extremist parties as well as their electoral success questions macro-
-sociological theory. When confronted by new developments in the social and political 
system, the approach extravagates its explanatory power. Therefore, changes must 
have taken place that questions the assumptions of the Cleavage Theory. A more exact 
investigation of such processes of change is particularly useful for an advancement of 
the theoretical basis of voting behaviour. This can be a starting point of necessary and 
meaningful modiﬁcations of these basic principles. Therefore, I would like to deal with
social transformation processes in more detail. 
The social scientist Ulrich Beck (1983: 35-74; 1986) was one of the ﬁrst to formu-
late the thesis that social transformation processes are stimulating individualization 
and diversiﬁcation of circumstances and lifestyles. These processes undermine the
hierarchical model of social classes and question its strength. Since then, the thesis in 
psephology has generally been accepted that the traditional social ties between voters 
and parties become weaker and the possibility of swing votes, protest votes and voter 
abstention increases. But also here it is important to take a closer look. Social classes 
in Germany have changed markedly since the country became a single entity. They 
do not exist any longer as ﬁghting political camps, but as traditional lines of different
lifestyles they are still evident. Cultural borders and mutual prejudices between social 
milieus still exist. The individualisation that comes with modernization of society did 
not dissolve the social layers, but multiplied them. The socio-structural classes have 
been differentiated even further and formed branches like a family tree. (Vester et al. 
2001: 13) “The cultural classes of every day life are […] right because of their abilities 
to change and to differentiate extraordinary stable. What erode are the hegemonies of 
certain parties (and groups of intellectuals) in the socio-political camps. Thus there 
is not a crisis of social milieus (because of value change) but a crisis of political re-
presentation (because of an increasing distance between élites and milieus).” (Vester 
et al. 2001: 13; author’s translation) There are two points, which are important in 
the following: Firstly, one can observe processes that weaken voter-party-coalitions 
postulated from the socio-structural theories. Secondly, there are empirical results that 
new social groups, based upon shared lifestyles and value orientation, emerge besides 
traditional classes and camps.
Unfortunately, a confusing abundance of different terms prevails in psephology, 
for instance socio-structural classes, political camps or social milieus. In case of their 
adoption it often remains unclear whether they include a different meaning too. I align 
myself with the following distinction: on a social level interest-based socio-structural 
classes and value-based social milieus exist. Both types have the potential – if mobi-
lized – to aspire the representation of their speciﬁc norms within the political system.
This representation can be accorded by parties, whereby voter-party-voter coalitions 
or political camps are constituted. The different lifestyles and value orientation, which 
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are marked in social milieus, can cause the desire to form a corresponding policy 
which like the interests, is organized -along the lines of social class. In both cases the 
parties are offering the citizens certain policy contents for representing their demands 
in the political system. Thus the coherent interaction between supply and demand 
can cause voter-party-coalitions. According to Ronald Inglehart’s (1977) thesis, the 
value change in the 1970s and 1980s led to a new cleavage within Western societies: 
between a materialistic value-orientation, characterized by striving for security and 
material supply, and post-materialistic value-orientation, corresponding with the wish 
for respect and self-realization. The Green Party could establish permanency, because 
it offered a political home for the post-materialistic values, mobilized in the peace and 
ecology movement. 
Within the integrative explanation model I introduce the domain “value orientati-
on/lifestyle” as a necessary supplement to socio-structural interests. Figure 1 illustra-
tes the reformulated sociological themes. I would also call for a new understanding 
of voter-party-coalitions: not any longer as stiff, essentially changeable structures, 
but as coalitions that form based on a certain policy demand, meeting an adequate 
policy supply. Voter-party-coalitions are joined and are abolished, with different 
social groups increasingly selective and speciﬁc to situation and topic. Coalitions
in this sense are strategic alliances, depending on circumstances and people, in the 
individual struggle for existence on the different social determined arenas. Whereas no 
socio-structural group-interests or value-orientations have became arbitrarily, but their 
political representation! The frozen voter-party-coalitions are loosened and now have 
to be mobilized increasingly by topics and situations. For example, during the election 
Figure 2: 
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campaign in 1998 it was useful for the SPD, to appeal to the “Neue Mitte”39, to induce 
union-aligned voters to elect SPD, in contrast to the election campaign of 2005, which 
stressed the difference between the two important political camps.40
With this reformulation no achievements of the sociological explanation models 
were given up. Both, ﬁrm socio-structural voter-party-coalitions as well as coalitions,
joined topic and situation speciﬁc, are explainable. The quality, quantity and stability
of the cleavages depend on the voters’ policy demand and the parties’ policy supply. 
Combined, this can lead to strong cross pressure as well as to ﬁrm party commitment.
The question of de-alignment or realignment is not decided; both developments stay 
explainable within the presented model. I want to stress once more the necessity of 
mobilization along the cleavages. Social conﬂicts are not bare theoretical constructs,
but political tensions between social groups, which have been signiﬁcant for a long
time. Therefore, the underlying conﬂicts have to be current to a certain extent other-
wise they could not have an impact on the voting behaviour. Voter-party-coalitions 
have to be revitalized from time to time as voters assure themselves about the political 
intentions of the parties. Especially at very political periods, such as election, voter-
-party-coalitions are affected by important issues (Pappi 1979: 466 et seq.; Schultze 
2003: 74).
Socio-psychological explanation approach: party identiﬁcation
Angus Campell and his colleagues formulated the socio-psychological explanation 
approach in the 1950s. Despite or perhaps because of the discussions about the trans-
ferability of the US-American Ann Arbor Model, it developed into one of the most 
prominent theories of the empirical election research outside the USA.41 The decision 
process at an election is described as a “funnel of causality”; at its exit is the voting 
decision. The short-term inﬂuences, such as preferences for candidates, parties and
issues precede this exit directly. Further long-term factors like party identiﬁcation or
social structure are again pre-aged in comparison to the short-term ones. (Campbell et 
al. 1960: 24-32) The party identiﬁcation serves as a political reference framework, to
order the complex political system. It provides a stable consistency in attitude, whereby 
due to the short-term factors, a voting decision deviating from the party identiﬁcation
is intended. The different motives are not imparted by objective occurrences, but by 
individual perception: The identiﬁcation with a group is more important than the actual
group membership. This evaluation shapes the attitude to issues, parties and candidates 
(Falter – Schumann – Winkler 1990: 8).
39 The SPD directed its election campaign towards centre voters. All voters who did not want to elect for 
the Union parties, after 16 years in government, should be able to vote for a modern SPD. The according 
slogan was “advancement and justice” that appealed to the Neue Mitte (New Centre). 
40 The federal election 2005 was affected by antagonism between SPD and Green party on the one side and 
CDU/CSU and FDP on the other side. The one camp wanted to stay, the other to be in government. 
41 Cf. for a brief overview about the discussion in Germany with pursuing reference (Wüst 2003: 99 et seq.; 
Gehring – Winkler 1997, 477).
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The central explanation concept within the socio-psychological approach is party 
identiﬁcation. The authors of the Ann Arbor Model deﬁned party identiﬁcation as fair-
ly long-term, affective embodied connection of a voter to a party, as a psychological 
identiﬁcation with a party (Campbell et al. 1960: 121 et seq.). In the scientiﬁc reception
of the model the concept of the party identiﬁcation was speciﬁed: Socio-structural
determinants and value-orientation respective lifestyles consolidate in the course of 
political socialization and lead across the perception of voter-party-coalitions to diff-
erent intense affective party identiﬁcation (Gehring – Winkler 1997: 477; Bretthauer
– Horst 2001: 397). Thereby it becomes evident that the modiﬁed socio-structural
explanation model supplements the socio-psychological approach. The motives, resul-
ting from socio-structural determinates, value orientation and lifestyles feed into the 
socio-psychological area. Whether the voter, based on his/her speciﬁc policy demand,
can identify with none, one or more parties, he will develop no party identiﬁcation, or
Figure 2: 
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a more or less signiﬁcant. Figure 2 illustrates the different pronounced party identiﬁca-
tion by the downward decreasing width of the triangle. 
Rational-choice approach
Previously presented motives explain the voting decision on the basis of personal 
preferences and socio-structural determinants. The rational-choice approach of Antho-
ny Downs, on the other hand, presumes that they go without saying. Moreover, voters 
and parties are regarded as rational actors, exchanging votes against the implemen-
tation of political aims. (Downs 1957: 23) Individuals acting rationally, when they 
choose in a given situation the alternative from which they can expect the best proﬁt.
Situational and political conditions lead the voter to make a voting decision due to its 
rationality. Citizens have to be able to arrange their desires and requirements and to 
evaluate the political alternatives according to this preference order (Downs 1957: 6). 
Correspondingly, the theory is based upon the axiom that if the parties want to win 
election, they will consider the voter’s preferences (Downs 1957: 11-13). The voter 
evaluates the parties according to their previous performance (retrospective) and their 
expected governmental performance, were they in power (prospective). Because the 
voters do have not sufﬁcient information, they make a choice based on uncertainty
about the real occurrences. The theory of the rational voter is limited in its explanatory 
power. The model is not able to explain satisfactorily why due to a large electorate and 
the almost insigniﬁcance of their votes citizens go to vote at all, or why small parties
get votes. They virtually have not any inﬂuence to governmental output (Arzheimer
– Schmitt 2005: 284-293). Down’s rational voter is therefore seen as a supplementary 
rather than as an alternative to the already presented explanation approaches of voting 
behaviour (Falter – Schumann – Winkler 1990: 13).
In my previous remarks the short-term factors of the Ann Arbor Model missed out 
the impact of political issues and their inﬂuence of party and candidate preferences.
Following Morris Fiorina’s enhancements of the rational voter and the New American 
Voter by Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks, I understand the evaluation of parties and 
candidates, intended in the social psychological approach, as a rational vote inﬂuenced
by uncertainty. There are three criteria, according to the Ann-Arbor model, that have 
to be fulﬁlled in order that the political agenda has an impact on the voting behaviour: 
A voter has to perceive an issue, ascribe importance to the problem and ﬁnally as-
sociate the answer to the question with a party (Gehring – Winkler 1997: 476). The 
decisive factor is which competence in problem solving, regarding the respective 
issues, parties and candidates are being ascribed. The evaluation process results 
from a prospective and retrospective performance review of parties and candidates 
(Bretthauer – Horst 2001: 398). Thus, the rational-choice approach unfolds within the 
Ann-Arbor model: on the one hand by the preference order of the issues and the posi-
tion of the voter according to these questions, on the other hand by evaluating parties 
and candidates.
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During this decision making process the voter is caught in a dilemma between 
insufﬁcient information and the high costs of a more comprehensive provision of
information. The voting decision becomes a cost-beneﬁt calculation. The voter shifts
a bigger part of the costs for selection, analysis and evaluation of information onto 
his/her social surroundings, interest groups, media, party programmes and so on. In 
this way the voter is able to limit uncertainty in a rational way (Wüst 2003: 101). 
Identiﬁcation with a party also eases the evaluation process. As assumed in the so-
cio-psychological approach and conﬁrmed by empirical studies, voters aligned with 
a party most likely assign the highest competence in solving political problems to this 
party. Thus a proﬁled party identiﬁcation has an impact on the evaluation of parties and
candidates (Schoen – Weins 2005: 212 et seq.). Figure 3 demonstrates the developed 
integrative model so far. In the dark grey area the rational-choice approach broadens 
the social psychological model.
Figure 3:
At this point it is worthwhile to ask what opportunities citizens have to unders-
tand the highly complex political system in order to make a well-informed decision. 
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A signiﬁcant party identiﬁcation structures the political room in advance to make the
opinion of his/her party – if it exists – to an assessment factor. But what works for 
a voter without party ties? Where does s/he obtain a benchmark to evaluate parties, 
candidates and their politics? He has no choice than to inform himself or to be informed 
by others: from personal discussions, newspapers, television, and media in common, 
in election campaigns; in short: by his/her participation in political communication.
Inﬂuence of political communication
From the ﬁndings that ever fewer voters have a signiﬁcant party identiﬁcation,
the area of political communication comes in psephology’s ﬁeld of vision. Herein the
agenda-setting approach proves useful, mainly because it is compatible with a plura-
lity of different concepts, complementing each another, e.g. with framing processes 
(McChombs 2000: 126). In the following section I give a brief sketch of the agenda-
-setting approach and framing processes. 
The core of agenda-setting is that the importance of different news items in the 
media coverage has inﬂuence on the political agenda (McChombs 2000: 123 et seq.).
This is based on the assumption that interpersonal communication replaced informa-
tion transfer in the course of the modernization of society. In contrast to this gained 
the media coverage more and more relevance for what we know about the world. 
Besides what the news is about, the nature of the media reports is important: the view 
we get from the scene, the presentation of the pictures, and the attributes used in the 
report. All of this has an inﬂuence on how we perceive and understand the news. Media
coverage has a certain context that is contained within the news. This contextualization 
has expanded into communication research as the term “framing” (Mc Chombs 2000: 
126 et seq.).
The media agenda and the way the news is produced can exert inﬂuence on our
voting decisions. The stress lies on “can”. It is important not to neglect the fact that the 
news is received by individual processes of news adaptation. Media coverage should 
be understood rather as an offer for the citizens to align their conceptions with those 
presented in the media and if applicable to agree with them, partly agree or to reject 
them. The fact alone that a certain line is being reported – and this is still very frequent 
and pushing – does not mean that one absorbs this viewpoint uncritically (Schmidt 
1994: 15 et seq.). Media coverage is one impact among factors which, considering 
the time spent on media consumption, is surely part of the individual news adaptation 
process. But how and with what inﬂuence depends on further factors: e.g. personal
knowledge and attitudes, the political climate of the social surroundings or the cir-
cumstances of the current situation.
With regard to the above we should refer to the ﬁndings of empirical studies ac-
cording to the agenda-setting thesis. In fact, at the aggregated level of media and the 
public, the signiﬁcant compliance of the media with the public agenda could be veri-
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ﬁed, but in fact the media agenda and the individual agenda correspond only to a very
limited extent. Instead, the personal embarrassment of a recipient and that of his/her 
social surrounding has an inﬂuence on the individual topic relevance to a much greater
extent. Information from the media inﬂuences a complex individual psychological and
group dynamic adaptation process. (Rössler 1997: 379-412)
Facing this theoretical imponderability of the impact of political communication 
on individual voting behaviour, it has to be agreed Otfried Jarren and Ulrich Sarcinelli 
(1998: 15; author’s translation) that “despite the comparatively high amount of single 
case studies, even the state of knowledge in the intensively operated election commu-
nication is limited because it lacks complex explanation models and comprehensive 
theoretical concepts that are going beyond highly specialized impact perspectives.” 
That means for the integrative explanation model that the area of political communi-
cation – except the brieﬂy presented impact hypothesis – has to be classiﬁed as a black
box. However, when facing the increasing importance of media information, we should 
not surrender to the complex correlations. Further research is necessary to shed light 
on the dark of the inﬂuences of political communication on the voting behaviour.
Figure 4:
Illustrated in ﬁgure 4, the impact of political communication is taken into account
as follows. On the one hand political communication has an inﬂuence on the political
agenda, by agenda-setting, and on the other hand on evaluating parties and candidates 
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through framing processes. The stronger the party is the less signiﬁcant the party iden-
tiﬁcation of voters is. A proﬁled party alignment is able to have a direct inﬂuence on 
the voting decision, without a “detour” over the evaluation process about candidates 
and parties (Schoen – Weins 2005: 198-200).
In conclusion, the model is completed by the aforementioned feature of important 
issues having the potential to have an impact on voters’ policy demand and the par-
ties’ policy supply, whereby voter-party-coalitions could be revitalized, mobilized or 
abolished. One could think of the German participation in the NATO deployment in 
Kosovo. As part of its government responsibility the Green Party agreed to the military 
intervention in the Balkans and abandoned their unconditional paciﬁsm. Some voters
of the Greens lost their party identiﬁcation and looked for a new political home.
Application of the integrative explanation model
After the integrative model has been completely outlined, it is essential to prove its 
explanatory power. The single motives of the voting decision, provided in the model, 
will be presented step by step on the basis of statistical data from the German federal 
election 2005, ﬁnishing with conclusive answer to the questions mentioned in the
introduction.
Class structures have had an impact on the voting decisions in this federal election 
too. For example, an above average proportion of Catholics voted (48 percent) for the 
Union parties. Thirty-four per cent of people without a religious afﬁliation gave their
vote to SPD, only 31 per cent to CDU/CSU, and to 20 per cent to the SPD. The high 
proportion of votes cast for the SPD is due to the fact that it is traditionally strong 
in atheist eastern Germany. Regarding the votes of employees, there is a stand-off 
between the two people’s parties. The CDU/CSU and SPD gained 34 per cent of votes 
among these voters. The fact, that just 20 per cent of unemployed persons voted CDU/
CSU should be thought provoking for supporters of the Union parties. The election 
campaign slogan “Putting work ﬁrst”42 apparently did not attract votes in this group. 
It was possible that jobless people had more fear of drastic reforms than hope for 
a quick economic recovery and the creation of new jobs by a Union Party-led federal 
government. This could also explain the success of the Linke PDS in this election 
group (25 per cent). But again the special situation in the eastern part of Germany has 
to be taken into account: high unemployment in connection with the strongly rooted 
left-wing party there (Die Wahl 2005: 15). The fact that the SPD, performing only 
moderately in the federal government and with social reforms such as Hartz IV, still 
reached 34 per cent in this voting group may surprise at ﬁrst sight. But it shows the
steady inﬂuence of social milieus regardless of short-term factors moving in opposite
directions. The best example is the Gelsenkirchen constituency. In this traditional SPD 
stronghold 53.8 per cent voted for the Social Democrats – the unemployment rate in 
Gelsenkirchen in 2004 was 19.9 per cent (Bundeswahlleiter 2005). Voter preferences 
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intensiﬁed by social milieus are not inﬂexible, and this was seen again in the results
in Bavaria. The CSU lost disproportionately in that constituency; they gained the best 
results at the federal election in 2002. And in lower Bavaria (57.3 per cent of second 
votes; minus 12.5 per cent compared to 2002), as in Upper Palatinate (51.2 per cent; 
minus 11.9 per cent), many votes were lost (Kießling 2005). Above all, the personnel 
decisions of the Union parties can serve as a possible reason for this. On the one hand 
the mobilizing effect of a Bavarian chancellor candidate was extraordinary high in the 
year 2002. But in the run-up to the election 2005 Stoiber did not want to decide on 
what to do in the case of an election victory: go to Berlin or stay in Munich. On the 
other hand, many potential voters of the CSU were sceptical about the entire leadership 
of the Union parties(Kießling 2005).
Let us deal with another staff decision. Angela Merkel presented her shadow cabinet 
on 17 August 2005. One of its members was the largely unknown ﬁnance expert and
former judge of the constitutional court Professor Paul Kirchhof. Initially it seemed 
that the surprise inclusion had achieved its goal. The media coverage was mainly po-
sitive (Media Tenor 2005a), and once more the candidate for Chancellor could prove 
that she meant the slogan “Give way to employment“ seriously: the tax policy could 
be subject to this too. But Kirchhof’s radical tax concept of a uniform tax rate of 25 
per cent with simultaneous omission of all exceptions had to frighten. Furthermore, 
afﬁrmations by the Union Parties that they would  implement the tax policy this way
by the Union parties did not help. In particular, the abolition of the “commuter lump 
sum“43 and the tax-exempt amounts for shift work and work on public holidays would 
have meant a tax increase for many employees (Feldenkirchen – Theile 2005: 62). This 
was the actual point of attack for the SPD, which concentrated largely on the unknown 
Paul Kirchhof and his opposition to “social injustice”, and the television debate cruci-
ally contributed to this image, proved by data from the “Infratest dimap”. Before the 
television discussion 42 per cent of interviewed people were of the opinion that Union 
parties pursued a good tax policy and only 28 per cent said the SPD had an adequate 
tax policy. After the television debate the opinion polls were balanced: CDU/CSU and 
SPD gained 35 per cent each (Infratest dimap 2005a). But if the election campaign had 
not been primarily restricted to the topics of employment and the economy, Kirchhof 
alone would not have had such an impact. As an opposition party, the CDU/CSU 
beneﬁted largely from the votes from the assumed or actual losers of the reforms of the
red-green federal government. Those were borrowed votes, bringing the conservative 
camp to a high poll position since 2002. The fact that the union parties abandoned 
committing to these groups permanently or making at least advances to them may have 
determined the election result (Drieschner 2005: 7) Another problem for the Union 
parties was that that they could not distinguish themselves as a party for socially weak 
groups and social equality. In this respect the antagonistic election campaign staged by 
SPD and Schröder caught on. The policies of the CDU/CSU were perceived as those 
42 Author’s translation of Vorfahrt für Arbeit. 
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of social indifference, personiﬁed by Paul Kirchhof,  making it simpler for the Social
Democrats to uphold their arguments (Kießling 2005).
This election also shows that media agenda might signiﬁcantly determine the
public agenda, and how the topics are relevant for the individual recipient and what 
impact they have could be different from the tenor of the media coverage. Roland 
Schatz, chief editor of the “Media Tenor”, made a forecast based on the analysis of its 
institute on 16 September: if the media support to CDU/CSU lasts at the last two days 
before the election the conservative camp will win (Media-Tenor 2005).44 Apparently 
the pictures of parties and candidates in the media differed from the one citizens had in 
mind. Otherwise the indecisive voters would have followed the media trend and voted 
for the Union parties.
What explains the large deviations between the last published polls and the election 
result? Two reasons are possible: either an important number of voters actually made 
their decision just before the election so that their vote could not be counted by the 
polling companies, or the poll methods had been in this case faulty. Therefore, the 
preferences of some voters could not correctly be measured, or not at all. Elisabeth 
Noelle (2005) assumes the party constellation after the election to the 16th German 
Bundestag is the result of an opinion formation that has to be fundamentally different 
from those preceding election. I suspect that a combination of both reasons tipped the 
scales for the inaccurate election prognoses.
In the run-up to the federal election there were not only many voters who were 
indecisive right up to the end. They were also in an impossible situation while making 
their voting decision. Renate Köcher from the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 
tellingly described tellingly as a “desponded mood of change” (Spreng 2005). In fact 
at the beginning of September 70 per cent of interviewed people were disaffected 
with the work of the red-green government. However, at the same time 50 per cent 
were sceptical whether a government led by the Union parties would do a better job 
(Infratest dimap 2005a). It was not surprising that 46 per cent of all voters said that 
the voting decision was never so difﬁcult in the past. This was mainly because the
parties’ political programmes differed greatly from each other – so 51 per cent of 
the asked ones. Neither the CDU/CSU nor SPD could successfully gain a picture of 
voter conﬁdence (Infratest dimap 2005b). Also, there had never been so many different
governmental coalitions imaginable in the run-up to an election. That makes it difﬁcult
for tactical voters. Facing this imponderability a closer look at polling methods could 
prove instructive. Which results do we get from undecided voters at the opinion polls? 
To deduce voter intentions, pollsters are looking for statistical “twins” in the data, i.e. 
those who expressed a voting intention and gave a similar answer to the question in 
the interview, as with those who did not make a statement regarding their vote. In the 
scale of statistical accuracy one assumes that undecided voters will decide like their 
43 It is a tax-deductible commuting expense for employed people; called “Pendlerpauschale” in German.
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statistical “twins” and therefore will be assigned as corresponding (Noelle-Neumann 
– Petersen 2005: 295). Facing the speciﬁc character of that election with all its impon-
derableness and indecisive voters, one may assume that the assignment of the voting 
intention through statistical twins was partially misleading this time.
Before examining the plausibility of this answer, let us have a closer look at the 
voters. Also in this election there was a core of loyal voters with a party identiﬁcation
strong enough to support their party largely independently from the inﬂuence of short-
-term factors. Another part of the electorate possessed a certain party identiﬁcation,
but this was less signiﬁcant. Situational personal attitudes and the prevailing election
campaign issues were able to affect their party identiﬁcation. These votes have to
be mobilized by the parties. If it does not succeed, a vote different from the party 
identiﬁcation becomes possible. To carry on this rough classiﬁcation of voters, there is
a third group possessing no signiﬁcant party identiﬁcation, above all using short-term
impacts for their its decision and showing afﬁnities to Down’s Rational Voter, whereas
“rationality” should not be interpreted in a strict way.45 The ﬁrst group of voters is for
the plausibility proof uninteresting. They make their voting decision early in favour of 
their party and that is reﬂected in the polls. Potentially this is different form the other
mentioned voter groups because for their vote short-term impacts were weighing much 
more. Since the election campaign of the Union parties was not qualiﬁed for scooping
even approximately the voter potential, the mobilizing impulse for the Union parties 
was largely missing. That enforces the potential impact of situational circumstances 
of the election. But they were largely all suitable to distract from the voting intention 
in favour of the Union parties: one-sided management of the election campaign, little 
convincing personnel, loss of interpretation sovereignty over important election cam-
paign issues (e.g. tax policy), reservations concerning a large coalition etc. The polling 
method to align voting intentions by statistical twins works better the more precise are 
the circumstances in the run-up to an election. For example, with a clear tendency for 
change, consistent preferences for party and candidate or clear strategic options on 
possible governmental coalitions. All of that was not evident before this election – the 
opposite occurred. So this time it was possible that one linked voters without voting 
tendency to statistical twins that made their voting decision more based on their party 
identiﬁcation. In that case there would be – as happened – a preponderance of the
CDU/CSU in the polls. For the voters who stayed indecisive to the last, the situational 
circumstances of the election have been more important. This made a vote for the Uni-
on parties improbable and could explain the large change of voters from CDU/CSU 
to FDP. If the voters without ﬁrm election intention possessed a weak identiﬁcation
with the Union, they would want to leave their votes in the conservative camp. The 
election campaign provided many good reasons for them to elect the FDP instead of 
the CDU/CSU this time.
44 Sure, the conclusion was also based upon the published polls that emerged as defective after the election. 
That has to be taken into account.
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Conclusion
Psephology recognizes a plurality of possible motives for voting behaviour, but 
without developing their systematic combination. Facing an increasing volatile electo-
rate, long-term motives lose their importance, while short-term factors have more of an 
impact. That fact has to be taken into account by the theoretical basics of psephology 
– not only in ad-hoc explanations in post-election interpretations. Therefore, I consider 
the following steps to be necessary: Firstly, take a revision of the macro-sociological 
“cleavage theory” and connect its strength in the causal explanation of the prognostic 
abilities of the micro-sociological model. Secondly, understand the decision logic of 
the rational-choice approach as an addition to the socio-psychological Ann Arbor Mo-
del. Thirdly, consider the inﬂuence of political communication on the voting decision
more strongly. Particularly the agenda-setting approach and the provision for framing 
processes have been proved proﬁtable in psephology when the individual relevance
of media coverage is taken into account too. Fourthly, combine the different voters’ 
motives to realize a systematic weighting of the single inﬂuence factors. It applies
to develop a balanced theory building, acquiring the individual voting behaviour 
preferably comprehensively. By the example of the election 2005 to the German Bun-
destag I hope to have clariﬁed that the outlined integrative explanation model can be 
a contribution to this, what my main thesis would prove.
Nevertheless, someone may have provisos against integrative approaches. Does not 
the existence of different capable models of the voting behaviour permit psephology to 
precisely analyse the complex process of voting decision sophistically? Is an integrative 
approach desirable, even though thereby subtleties of the theories deriving in different 
science traditions will be lost? The model sketch should clarify that the expressiveness 
of the single theories persists completely despite the integration. Combining the single 
election motives systematically provides a further development in our understanding of 
voting behaviour. An abundance of different explanation approaches is not a criterion 
of quality. They have to be related meaningfully to each other so that from the bare 
abundance a proﬁtable variety of theoretical models arises.
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